### 1NC – Black Gold K

#### Black gold, as a term for the wealth of African civilization and the production of energy, isn’t a strategic re-appropriation. Our counter genealogy of the project of presenting Nigerian oil wealth and African cultural heritage as black gold proves this strategy reproduces the form of colonial exploitation even though it changes the content.

Andrew **APTER** Anthropology @ Chicago **’96** “The Pan-African Nation: Oil-Money and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria” Public Culture 8 p. 441-442

When OPEC came of age in January of 1977, an oil-rich Nigeria hosted Africa’s Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (Festac ’77) “to recapture the origins and authenticity of the African heritage.”’ Featured as a black world‘s fair, Festac produced an extravagant spectacle of ethnic diversity, Nigerian nationalism, Pan-African unity and utopian modernity which literally staged “global Africa” in Nigeria’s National Theatre. Throughout this festival of cultural revival, from its planning stages in Lagos to the closing durbar ceremony in Kaduna, a distinctive ideology of black culture and Africanity emerged which owed much to earlier ideas of Negritude and African Personality, but in key respects diverged from them. This divergence can be identified in specific events, such as the falling out between Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s Head of State and Grand Patron of Festac, and Senegal’s President LCopold Senghor , who abdicated his position as Festac’s co-patron and virtually boycotted the festival. It can also be understood in relation to Nigeria’s distinctive federalism, which, recently traumatized by the Biafran War (1967-70), sought to normalize the distribution of political power between competing ethnic blocs. But the underlying “secret” of Festac’s Pan-African project, motivating its representations of culture and race, was the development of a state regulated oil economy which revitalized the nation with unprecedented wealth.\* This essay will examine how Festac ’77 celebrated the marriage of “tradition” with “fast capitalism” in Nigeria (Watts 1992), commodifying culture in the National Theatre through its forms of exhibition and display (see Karp and Lavine 199 1) .3 Such investment of culture with commodity-value- a veritable fetishism of “fetishes”- masked a complex series of ethnic conflicts and class contradictions which intensified under oil-capitalism. For unlike the imperial world‘s fairs of Europe and North America, which deployed racial and cultural idioms to naturalize colonial hierarchies and essentialize alterity , race and culture functioned in Festac as commutable tropes of radical inclusion, seeking to neutralize the paradoxes of state wealth and power in a universalizing black nationalist ideology. And unlike the socialist humanism of Senghor’s earlier Nkgritude movement, celebrated in Dakar in the first Festac of 1966, Festac ’77 signaled Nigeria’s triumphant emergence as a significant player in globalc~apitalism.~ In fact, Festac celebrated a moment of articulation between Nigeria and the world economy which centralized the state to an unprecedented degree (Watts 1992: 36), overwhelming the regional control of Marketing Boards initially established under British colonialism-cocoa in the West, palm oil in the East, groundnuts and cotton in the North (Helleiner 1966). These latter cash-crops dwindled in prestige and value compared with the petro-dollars commanded by high grade oil which was protected by OPEC and sold to the highest Western bidders. Nigeria had already reorganized its three Regions into four (1963), then into twelve states (1967), and later into nineteen states (1969).5 A series of National DevelopmentPlans accelerated by oil-capitalism in the 1970s, however, lubricated the domestic 443 Oil-Money and Spectacle in Nigeria economy with a state spending-spree. A utopian vision of economic growth and modernization swept the nation as the government built new highways, doubled government salaries in the famous Udoji Reform, and expanded the public sector with new hospitals, schools, and parastatal industries. Fast-capitalism indeed. Nigeria proudly proclaimed its leading role as the political and economic giant of black Africa, and enshrined this message in its National Theatre, which served, in the words of Festac’s first president, Chief Anthony Enahoro, as “the centre of Nigerian national life” (Indigo n. d . : 16). In hindsight, Festac proved to be a grand illusion, in that the new Nigeria never quite materialized. At least not for long. Today, the National Theatre has fallen into a state of disrepair. What was once a monument to a booming oil economy is now crumbling and cracking at the seams, like the morally and economically bankrupt nation-state so thoroughly plundered by its ruling military clique. Soon after Festac, Shagari’s Second Republic ( 1979- 1983) mismanaged its way into a series of military coups which imposed austerity on the masses while draining the Federal treasury. Thereafter the world price of oil dropped precipitously, intensifying struggle for what remained. The aborted 1993 national elections represent the final demise of democratic reform in a country racked by strikes, riots, shootings, and shortages ever since. The winner of the June 12 elections, business tycoon Chief Moshood Abiola, still languishes in prison, while the military government plays cat and mouse with his supporters.6 Oil, once the demi-god of national rebirth, now stands for national pollution and decay (Soyinka 1994). As the late Ken Saro-Wiwa championed the cause of the Ogoni people, whose fishing creeks have been ruined by oil spills and whose rights have been systematically abused (Saro-Wiwa 1992), a recent audit of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s books revealed $12.4 billion unaccounted for (based on windfall profits from the Gulf War), siphoned into political payoffs and private Swiss accounts (Ukim 1994).

#### Using “black gold” to mobilize anti-racism leaves us powerless to criticize militaristic regimes based on oil extraction. The 1ACs heroic narrative of African heritage and wealth combined with the call for production quashes dissent from the modernist ideology of production.

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Located in Lagos and built for Festac within a network of new highways, the National Theatre established the “exemplary center” (Geertz 1980: 11-18) not only of festival activities, but also of a new Nigeria. Its circular structure, occupying 23,000 square meters and rising thirty-one meters, resembled the hub of a cosmographic wheel radiating out through architectural “spokes” and superhighways to embrace the modern world. Viewed from the outside, the Theatre’s facade looked like a giant crown rising out of the earth, as if linking the wealth of the land - its chthonic traditions and subterranean oil - with national territory and sovereignty. A closer look revealed the Nigerian coat-of-arms perched like a jewel at the center of an architectural diadem. This image evoked a new association between the National Theatre and the military regime, whose “head of state” wore a military hat which also resembled the Theatre’s facade and sported the same coat-of-arms in its “crown” (Figures 1 and 2). Festac organizers of Nigeria’s National Participation Committee jokingly referred to the National Theatre asGeneral Gowon’s “cap.” By the time the festival opened, two military governments 445 Oil-Money and Spectacle in Nigeria later, the same joke applied to General Obasanjo.~ Viewed from within, the National Theatre offered state-of-the-art facilities. The Theatre Hall was the major showpiece, providing an extravagant venue for cultural performances and “dance-dramas,” with 5,000 seats, a rotating thirtythree by forty-four meter stage, an orchestral stand, a rampart of stage lights, and a set of earphones at every seat which were hooked up to interpreter’s booths equipped for simultaneous translation into eight major languages. \* Radio and television booths were also installed to broadcast Festac performances to the outside world. Even the theatre’s foyers and restrooms were equipped with closedcircuit televisions. The smaller Conference Hall, with 1,500 seats, boasted identical translation facilities for foreign delegates and visitors, for it was here that the much vaunted Festac Colloquium took place, with scholars from forty-one countries presenting 269 papers on ten subthemes of Black Civilization (Iwara and Mveng 1977:220-237). As we shall see, these two major venues served the two most basic components of Festac ’77: the choreographed performances of traditional cultures and dramatic arts, and the more intellectual exchange between black and African scholars. Equally important, however, were two large Exhibition Halls which displayed traditional sculpture, musical instruments, and architectural technology, as well as modern art works, mostly by Nigerian~.~ A modernist vision was thus clearly inscribed on the surfaces and in the spaces of the National Theatre, embracing the latest audiovisual and administrative technology in black Africa’s largest and wealthiest country. As champion and herald of a new black world order, Nigeria played host, through its National Theatre, to a self-styled Black United Nations which invited representatives from the widest reaches of the black world, and which not only rivaled the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in scale, but challenged its authority in the Festac Colloquium as well as in the popular press (Olusanya n.d. :24). In the official discourse of Festac’s organizers, which included the Grand Patron and Head of State LieutenantGeneral Olusegun Obasanjo and associated top military brass and Federal Commissioners, Festac’s goals were made explicit: “To succeed, we must restore the link between culture, creativity, and mastery of modern technology and industrialism . . . to endow the Black Peoples all over the world with a new society, deeply rooted in our cultural identity, and ready for the great scientific and technological task of conquering the future” (Iwara and Mveng 1977:7). The modernist hi-tech National Theatre was an appropriate venue for this great “restoration,” staging cultural tradition for privileged representatives of the black world‘s imminent emancipation. We can easily appreciate Festac’s popular appeal in the affirmation of common origins, racial solidarity and shared colonial and cultural experience that was voiced by elites on behalf of the masses and disseminated by the mass media. Festac was, after all, a “grand jamboree.”1° Juju music superstar King Sunny Ade dominated the airwaves with his welcoming song, “Festac for Black People,” as Nigerian hospitality achieved new heights. Interviews with academics and government officials flooded the press , expressing quasi-utopian visions of a prosperous future while invoking Nkrumah, Du Bois, Garvey, and C. L. R. James among other Pan-Africanist heroes. Leftist intellectuals like Wole Soyinka and Biodun Jeyifo added dissenting voices, perceiving the chinks in Festac’s populist facade and calling for greater mass participation through a more genuinely popular theater (Jeyifo 1979). But even Soyinka- who founded the University of Ife’s Guerilla Theatre Unit -participated in the Festac colloquium, where he criticized the OAU for its lack of unity and, in a surprising turn, advocated Swahili as a Pan-African language (Soyinka 1977:49). To appreciate the role of the National Theatre, however, in “restoring the link” between “tradition” and “modernity,” and to grasp the political transformation of culture which this great restoration entailed, we most go beneath Festac’s overt ideology and examine the hidden hegemonies which operated behind the scenes. The first hidden hegemony concerns the rationalization of “traditional culture” into state-regulated categories of space and time. Spatially , Festac’s planning committee divided the black world into sixteen zones comprising seventy-five countries and communities, and extending throughout Africa to include Caribbean countries like Haiti, Montserrat, and the Dominican Republic; Latin American countries like Venezuela and Brazil; as well as “black communities in North America, Ireland, India, Papua New Guinea, and West Germany (Festac ’77 1977:137-139). Clearly an imperial imagination was at work, echoing if not consciously reproducing the branches of Garvey’s Universal Negro ImprovementAssociation (Martin 1976: 16). But over and above the countries themselves, the bureaucratic logic of Festac’s planning committee offered equal time and space to its participating representatives, making the rotating main stage available to guest performers and allowing two hours and fifteen minutes for each production. In the Exhibition Hall, similar parity was accorded to exemplary visual and plastic arts displayed on walls and in cases. The point is not that all black and African cultures were thus exhibited, but that in principle they could be, for each represented the same message in a distinctive idiom and style, i.e. ,“the individuality, the antiquity and the power of the Black and African world.” In the bureaucratic semiology of the National Theatre - at once a place and a performance - all “traditional” signs acquired the same contemporary meaning within the master narrative which shaped official display. Through the legislated equivalence of spatial and temporal categories (in Foucault’s terms its “architecture of distribution”), the National Theatre homogenized ethnic differences into distinctive representations of equivalent cultural and “racial” value- that of the black African world entering the mainstream of industrial capitalism. And as Festac’s events progressed, “traditional” dance gave way to “contemporary dance theatre” and ballet, while the Exhibition Hall turned to modern Nigerian and African artists. The culturally differentiated past was thereby assimilated to Nigeria’s modernist agenda (see Appadurai 1990:4). In Festac’s official program, the rationalization of “traditional” culture culminated in the Colloquium on Black Civilization and Education, shifting registers from the dramatic and aesthetic to the overtly intellectual. Termed the “heart of Festac” by the Grand Patron, it was more appropriately its head, an “intellectual awakening” designed to celebrate the Black World’s heritage, decolonize the black scholar’s mind once and for all, and articulate Festac’s goals in a program for future action (“The Lagos Programme”). The Colloquium featured opening addresses, public lectures, and the reports of five working groups representing thirty-five countries and international organizations such as the OAU, UNESCO, and even the Holy See. Topics were organized around five conjunctive themes, concerning the relation of Black Civilization to Arts and Pedagogy; African Languages and Literature; Philosophy and Religion; Historical Awareness and African Systems of Government; and Science, Technology, and Mass Media (Mveng 1977: 1 17). It is not the substance ol’these discussions which I shall address, but their formal categories, their implicit “progress” from art to science, and the communicative context itself. Nigeria’s Head of State squirm in his chair as Wole Soyinka lambasted “the robots of leadership politics with their narrow schematism” (Soyinka 1977:45) while damning his government with faint praise. But underlying and ordering the range of positions, and manifesting the power of the Nigerian State-administered as it was through an international Colloquium Committee - were the categories which structured the discursive field itself. The Colloquium established an archive of knowledge, planned to fill six volumes, which would attest to the intellectual integrity and unity of Black Civilization. l1 If select scholars offered particular views, it was the Nigerian State, through Colonel (Dr.) Amadu A. Ali, the Honorable Federal Commissioner for Education and Colloquium Chairman, which authorized the presentations and published proceedings. Under the guise of a unified object of knowledge, the unity was imparted by the Nigerian Government and its military regime of truth, which forged the very categories of the archive. If the depth and span of Black Civilization achieved little consensus among the participants, it could be categorically imposed by the organizers. Moreover, the epistemological division of labor, represented by the five working groups ranging from the arts to the sciences, echoed Western imperial themes of social evolution and progress. When speakers deviated from Festac’s developmental agenda, the heroic narrative of Africa’s ascent to modernity restored the official story (see Corbey 1993). Like the bureaucratic semiology of the performing and visual arts, which converted cultural difference into equivalent ideological value, the Colloquium produced a master narrative of Black Civilization which subsumed dissenting voices. And in its triumphant march from traditional arts to scientistic modernity, rewriting the past to take on the future, it reproduced the hegemony of the Nigerian state. This can be seen in the Colloquium’s opening ceremonies, initiated by the Grand Patron himself, who poured a “traditional” libation of water and alcohol to honor unspecified gods and ancestors, as well as the important guests at his high table, which included the Yoruba Oba (king) of Lagos, King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, President Sir Jawara of The Gambia, and President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone. Young girls in “traditional” dress brought calabashes with kola nuts that were broken and distributed among the dignitaries. The Grand Patron thus established himself as the patron of the Black World in what served as a distinctively African opening, uniting its members in a secular church. The libation was followed by the Festac Anthem, sung by the Festac Choir, to which the assembled officials and delegates stood at attention. l2 Festac’s President, Colo-nel0. P. Fingesi, delivered opening remarks, followed by the Colloquium Chair- 449 Oil-Money and Spectacle in Nigeria man- both top-ranking officers in the Nigerian military government. Through this opening and ordering of communicative acts, and in the Pan-African language of fraternity and communitas, the Nigerian state established itself at the center of the Black World, with the military government in charge.

#### Black gold is a crucial concept for associating African culture with extraction and exploitation.

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Festac’s rationalization of tradition defused Nigerian ethnic politics by according different cultural traditions equivalent value within a unified Nigeria and the larger Black World. For this abstraction of identity from ethnic diversity became the formula for modernity itself. Like a grand capitalist marketplace, ethnic identities were realized through the production and consumption of standardized exchange-values, except that here the surplus-value of Black Civilization accrued to the Nigerian state. It is perhaps no coincidence that the final and “highest” form of knowledge in the Colloquium’s archive was Black Civilization and Mass Media, privileging a technology of power which reproduced ethnic identities as commensurable icons and simulacra for mass consumption (see Baudrillard 1975; 1983). This latter aspect of rationalization shades into a second hidden transformation whereby culture itself was commodified. Festac demonstrated that an oil-rich Nigeria placed a premium on cultural traditions, which’it financed, “reproduced on stage, and marketed for tourists. A new class of culture-brokers emerged, selling the images, icons, and ideas of “traditional” Africa to a broad range of national and international consumers. Indeed, Festac ’77’s trademark of a sixteenth-century royal Benin ivory mask became a familiar symbol of Nigerian grandeur spanning a wide spectrum of meanings: of African kingship, of cultural genius, of European contact and Portuguese “trade” (primarily slaves), of British intransigence (the British Museum refused to return the original mask), and above all, of commodity-va1~e.IN~o other image was so mass-produced and commodified, both in souvenir replicas and on fliers and broadsheets which sold the ideaof Festac under the sign of African sovereignty (Figure 3). This iconic association of African culture with commodity-value was in fact allegorized by the Festac flag. As explained in a promotional book published by the International Festival CommitteeThe flag of the Festival is a tricolour flag of three equal perpendicular rectangles. The two outside rectangles are black and the central rectangle is in gold. Over the gold is superimposed centrally the festival emblem. The black colour represents the black people of the world. The gold color represents two ideas. It represents the wealth of the culture of the areas and peoples embraced by the Festival. It also stands for the non-black peoples associated with black people in the Festival. (Festac ’77 1977: 137) Here the Festac emblem performed a double synthesis; first by associating all black peoples with the wealth of their “culture,” and second, through the ambiguity of the gold rectangle, which extended the wealth of black culture to “non-black peoples. ” Visitors were indeed welcome to attend Festac and enjoy its festivities. They were also welcome to purchase works of art: not original antiques, of course, but replicas and contemporary paintings and sculptures. As the promotional Festac book announced: “The acquisition of any works of art exhibited shall be made through the International Festival Committee. The price of each work shall be shown in (US) dollars. The price of each work shall exclude local taxes” (p. 152). Here is the consummation of culture commodified. The “pure” value of an exhibited culture, unperturbed by local taxes, was measured in U.S. dollarsthe international currency of global capital and key ingredient of industrial development. The road built by Festac from tradition to modernity was thus forged through a series of commutative reductions; first, by assimilating cultural diversity to a singular Black Civilization, and second, by commodifying culture itself, measuring its value in U.S. dollars and selling it to international consumers. Culture (the past, tradition) and capitalism (the future, modernity) were thus homogenized by the “general equivalent” (Goux 1990: 3) of the money-form. Not that Festac was banking on cultural commodities to invest in the Black World’s future. But Nigeria did have oil, which it sold, like black culture, through a state-appointed committee. Oil for dollars, art for dollars; the equivalence was confirmed by the spectacular scale of the festival itself. As Coronil(l987,1988, in press) has already revealed in the “money-fetishism” of Venezuela’s oil economy, Nigeria’s oil-wealth - black gold indeed-appeared as a form of money-magic which emanated from,the ground and was tapped by the government (Barber 1982; Watts 1992, 1994). l5 Conspicuous spending, fleets of hi-tech Festac buses, and the intensified consumption of luxury imports brought the signs of development without its substance.16 By equating petro-dollars with the value of black culture-after all both were indigenous resources -Festac created a dramaturgy of state power (see Cohen 1981) which masked the material conditions of Nigeria’s new prosperity. Briefly stated, Nigeria’s goal as a developing country, to build an efficient and productive industrial economy, was implemented from above, by a state which swelled the civil service, imported commodities and expensive technology, while promoting little indigenous production. l7 If new wealth circulated through private hands, little was invested in private industry, since it was mainly acquired through patronage networks that provided coveted access to state resources. The Nigerian ruling class was primarily a state class, based less on the exploitation of wage-labor and more on the exploitation of state power and wealth, through a de facto market of government contracts, licenses, and offices (Berry 1985: 13- 14). Moreover, it was a growing class financed by exceptionally high-grade oil. As the state expanded the public sector, forestalling organized assaults on its position by absorbing whole sectors of the economy together with their internal class divisions and tensions, it internalized the entire process of class formation (pp. 13- 14), recruiting the educated elite into the civil service while providing free education and hospital care for the masses. It was a dizzy time, as administrative structures, civil servants, and employment opportunities proliferated, as cash and commodities accelerated in complementary flows, and as fortunes of wellconnected “contractors” appeared overnight without any apparent relation to investment or hard work. The magic of Nigeria’s nascent modernity was based on unproductive accumulation that was controlled by the state. Obasanjo was indeed the Grand Patron of state clientism, building a modern black nation on black gold and culture. It was only a matter of time before the growing demands on Nigeria’s oil revenues would far outstrip their value. It was thus within the dialectic of a self-consuming state- a rapidly expanding public sphere that was simultaneously privatized by kickbacks and subsidies(Watts 1992:37) - that Festac’s commodification of culture made ideological sense, masking divisive ethnic cleavages and the absence of indigenous production through the production of Indigenous Culture. As a dramaturgy of power, Festac obscured the growing class divisions that were absorbed by the state, reproduced by its clients, and objectified by the “fetishism” of both “traditional” culture and imported commodities, cut loose from their moorings and reduced as they were to exchangeable signs of modernity. Through Festac’s forum of public culture, ethnic difference and class formation were subsumed by the inclusive horizons of blackness. Festac was for black people because the state was expanding at its own expense. Within Nigeria’s spectacle of Black Civilization, the contradictions of the oil economy were nowhere to be seen.

#### The rhetoric of black gold coopts anti-racist struggle into nationalistic development.

Andrew **APTER** Anthropology @ Chicago **’96** “The Pan-African Nation: Oil-Money and the Spectacle of

Culture in Nigeria” Public Culture 8 p. 454-455 [Footnote 19 added]

It is here that I would like to return to the racial dimensions of Festac’s conception of Black Civilization. I have mentioned that “blackness” functioned as a category of radical inclusion, assimilating cultural, national and ideological differences to rationalized forms of commodity -value. Blackness assumed the semantic function of a super-class and the rhetorical function of a master trope, unifying Festac’s field of different communities, cultures, and nations into a common heritage and program for future development. This assimilation expanded the horizons of the black world; first qua Africa, which the Colloquium unified by tracing “Negro-African” languages back to Ancient Egyptian (Obenga 1977: 94-104); second, to the black diaspora cultures which disseminated out of Africa through the European slave trade; and finally, to non-African “blacks” like Australian and Papuan aborigines, whose “blackness” derived from an ambiguous combination of phenotypical attribution and former colonial subjugation. We may note that this third “racial” category was never completely absorbed, but repeatedly surfaced in the designation “Black and African World,” thus sustaining an implicit division within Festac’s global imaginary. But I am less interested in whether or not “blackness” was a racial category as such, than in how and why its racial overtones provided a powerful idiom for constructing a global community. l8 If “blackness” covered a spectrum of historical, cultural, national, and transnational meanings, it also retained a racial inflection which was never entirely eliminated, even by the most “enlightened attempts to define it nonascriptively, as in the words of a Commissioner of Education: “What makes the race is what it has actually achieved” (David-West n.d.:27). Festac’s category of blackness is significant precisely because it pushed the idea of race to its limit. Embedded in concepts of history and culture, it could not be entirely reduced to these concepts, but assimilated them to the master-trope of blackness instead. To be sure, Festac’s black world owed much to the earlier ideologies of Negritude and African Personality which it reformulated along more modernist lines. As a racial idiom, it must be historicized within the anticolonial struggles and nationalist movements of Africa and the Caribbean, and must take into account the racial taxonomies of the colonial imagination, against which these movements developed their meaning and momentum (creating, in Sartre’s [ 1969:xll famous phrase, an “anti-racist racism”). As such, Festac inherited an historical discourse about blackness, one which encountered new contradictions in the country which celebrated Black Civilization with such unprecedented excess. For in Festac, blackness was wedded not only to historically specific forms of rationalization and commodification - old black culture turned new mass culture - but to a specific modality of universalization as well, all of which derived new meaning and momentum from the discovery of oil. As Nigeria’s oil provided fresh blood for a new and revitalized Black World, Nigeria’s wealth became the cultural wealth of all black peoples and nations (cf. Coronil 19875-6 et passim).19 Whereas Coronil (1987: 6) demonstrates that Venezuela’s oil economy fetishized money and oil as “‘black gold‘ circulating through the vessels of the social body,” thereby identifying the “oil nation” with its “natural body” (p. 3,th e Nigerian oil economy expressed the nation’s “natural body” in racialized (and transnational) idioms of blackness. Coronil’s pioneering study of oil-capitalism and national culture in Venezuela, with its focus on the state’s “theater of development” (p. 2), establishes a powerful analytic framework for studying comparable processes of value production and its ideological transpositions in other oil nations, such as Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. We can note, for example, how Festac’s explicit project of assimilating traditional culture to national development contrasts with the opposition between civilization and barbarism which Venezuela’s nationalist vision sustained. For a critical analysis of this ideological opposition in the history of Venezuelan nationalism, see also Skurski 1993 As tradition mixed with modernity, and as culture mixed with oil, so oil mixed with blood. Rationalized, commodified, universalized, and thus fetishized, culture was assimilated to racial identity because “blackness” represented the general equivalent of an imagined transnational community .20

#### We should use the language of environmental justice for challenging racism in energy production. This rhetoric helps build bottom-up movements to challenge global oil extraction.

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2. Environmental Justice and Environmental Racism in Perspective A useful entry point into the environmental justice and environmental racism discourse is an acknowledgement of the role these constructs, and the social activism built around them, have played in ‘humanising’ the broader environmental movement. Principally, they helped to debunk notions of the environment as the ‘non-human’ abode of birds, earthworms and fishes, and of environmental engagement as being about ‘the protection of natural systems and species’ and the ‘rights of nature’ (Hargrove, 2001: ix). Environmental justice and environmental racism highlighted the fact that the environment is ‘a set of linked places ‘where we live, work, learn and play’ (Turner and Wu, 2002) – a thinking which echoes a common belief in the indigenous forest regions of Southern Nigeria that the ‘earth, our mother’, is where we derive our individual and collective identities (Mitee, 2002; Uchendu, 1979). According to Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004), the humanising (and debunking) of the discourse of the ‘deep ecologists’ could mark the end of mainstream environmentalism as we know it. From the understanding that the environment is where we ‘live, work, learn and play’, environmental justice came to be officially defined, by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in particular, as fair treatment of people of diverse racial, national, ethnic and income backgrounds with regard to their partic ipation in the ‘development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, programs and policies’ (Dorzback, 2001). This definition also implies that no community should be unfairly exposed to negative environmental consequences of private or public industrial decisions, policies and projects that fundamentally benefit another group. In the United States, these contemporary propositions are widely regarded as the fruits of decades of environmental activism and research. They are widely traced to the 1960s American civil rights struggles, although there are suggestions that the environmental justice movement in North America goes back to the last decade of the fifteenth century (Turner and Wu, 2002). While environmental justice activism in the United States is historically associated with ‘people of colour’, especially following the ground-breaking protests in 1982 by African-Americans against moves to locate a polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) landfill in Warren County, North Carolina, the movement has since the 1990s broken racial, gender, age and class boundaries (Bullard, 2000: xiii). Environmental racism, one of the most conspicuous contributions of the environmental justice movement to the global environmental discourse, is defined as ‘any policy, practice, or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color’ (Bullard, 2000: 98). Its proponents maintain that the very environmental practices that have brought gains to particular segments of society, often achieve that goal by making victims of specific groups and communities in the same society, with racial and ethnic minorities being the most adversely affected (Bullard, 1994). According to Austin and Schill (1994), there is a discernible pattern to the environmental problems of America’s ‘black, brown, red, and poisoned’ communities. As socioeconomic conditions improve for white jobholders, they relocate from residential areas neighbouring the hazardous industrial plants in which they work, vacating homes which low-income people of colour are only too willing to move into. Even so, polluting industrial estates are sources of cheap residential land, and poor African-Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, Asians, migrants and other minorities typically regard them as ‘prime’ housing sites. Furthermore, for polluters such as operators of incinerating plants, there is every economic sense in setting up operations close to where the hugest supply of waste is guaranteed (Austin and Schill, 1994: 53-54). For Bullard (2000: 3), it all boils down to the fact that polluters regard poor communities as the ‘path of least resistance’. Environmental justice and environmental racism are thus narratives which attempt to shed light on the ‘abuse’ of the ecological rights of the ‘powerless’, and on community struggles to uphold those rights. The perspective has been used to illuminate the struggles of grassroots groups in India, Colombia, Venezuela, Nigeria and virtually everywhere else. In India, for example, the struggles of the group Chipko Andolan (literally ‘hug a tree’) movement not only signify what Obi (2005: 1) calls ‘revolutionary pressures from below’; they also reinforce the view highlighted earlier that rural people in many societies regard the natural environment as an extension of community identity and a space over which they must exercise their rights. The Chipko movement, which started in the 1970s, consists mainly of women who view commercial logging as a threat to the sustainability of the Himalayan ecology and an erosion of their right to determining what constitutes sustainable use of forest resources. In the Garhwal Himalaya in particular, where hillside forests regulate water runoff to the valleys and provide local communities with fuel wood and fodder, villagers blame commercial logging as amajor cause of landslides and floods and a factor in local impoverishment. Chipko activism consists of such singular steps as village women scampering into the forest upon sighting the loggers, and each woman hugging a tree such that to cut it down, an operator would literally have to place his chainsaw on the back of a protester (Weber, 1988). Also from an environmental justice perspective, oil-related protests in the oil-rich U’wa community of Colombia’s Norte de Santander province (in the northeast of the country) are viewed as struggles to ensure that resource exploitation policies and corporate practices reflect community sensibilities about the environment. The U’wa regard oil exploration as an activity that drains ‘mother earth’ of its ‘blood’. For them, oil production is ‘genocidal’. Apparently not lured by the economic promise of petroleum, their campaign has traditionally consisted of the threat of mass suicide should oil operations be undertaken in their territory without their endorsement. Thus, when in 1992, Shell and Occidental Oil (Oxy) were given the rights to explore for oil in the U’wa homeland (found at the time to hold an estimated 1.5 billion barrels of untapped crude), the companies and the Colombian state came up against heavy protests (van Haren, 2000). The strong opposition among the nomadic Warao Indians (in Venezuela’s Delta Amacuro State) to petroleum exploration in the Orinoco River Delta has similarly been documented (Gutierrez, 1997; Bassey, 1997: 36). The environmental justice discourse and, in particular, the concept of environmental racism, highlights an important social justice dimension of the power asymmetries between social groups. Such asymmetries are believed to characterise the relations between big industrial corporations (often acting with the state’s backing) and ordinary citizens. Apparently because of its emphasis on social justice, the environmental justice perspective continues to enjoy prominence, providing an analytical bridge between the ‘environmental’ and the ‘social’. Not surprisingly, environmental justice has become a vital resource in the sustainability debate. For development to meet the needs of the present generation without making it impossible for posterity to meet its own needs – as the United Nation’s World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) defined sustainable development – it is imperative that local communities, regardless of colour, race and income, become involved in the design and implementation of industrial policies. The utilisation of environmental resources (be it petroleum, gold, forests or rivers) must also be done within an institutional and legal framework that ensures that the benefits (and costs) are equitably distributed across the population.

### 2NC Card

#### Second-- We take issue with their emphasis on code switching. Code switching isn’t just something that opressors do and then cease oppressing. Oppressors also switch codes IN ORDER TO OPRESS. Skills, styles, and aesthetics of different codes should not be used as proof that something is “next level” because there is no *ultimate level*, form, or code. Treating a form or code – even a practice like code-switching -- as inherently worthy of endorsement merely makes “next level” oppression that much harder to detect.

Berthold **BRECHT** **’67** “Against Georg Lukacs” in *Aesthetics and Politics* [1977]Trans. Ed. Ronald Taylor p.81-83

Now we come to the concept of realism. This concept, too, must first be cleansed before use, for it is an old concept, much used by many people and for many ends. This is necessary because the people can only take over their cultural heritage by an act of expropriation. Literary works cannot be taken over like factories: literary forms of expression cannot be taken over like patents. Even the realistic mode of writing, of which literature provides many very different examples, bears the stamp of the way it was employed, when and by which class, down to its smallest details. With the people struggling and changing reality before our eyes we must not cling to ‘tried’ rules of narrative, venerable literary models, eternal aesthetic laws. We must not derive realism as such from particular existing works, but we shall use every means, old and new, tired and untried, derived from art and derived from other sources to render reality to men in a form they can master. We shall take care not to describe one particular, historical form of novel of a particular, epoch as realistic – say that of Balzac or Tolstoy – and thereby erect merely formal, literary criteria for realism. We shall not speak of a realistic manner of writing only when, for example, we can smell, taste and feel everything, when there is ‘atmosphere’ and when plots are so contrived that they lead to psychological analysis of character. Our concept of realism must be wide and political, sovereign over all conventions.

Realistic means: discovering the causal complexes of society / unmasking the prevailing view of things as the view of those who are in power / writing from the standpoint of the class which offers the broadest solutions for the pressing difficulties in which human society is caught up / emphasizing the element of development / making possible the concrete, and making possible abstraction from it.

These are vast precepts and they can be extended. Moreover we shall allow the artist to employ his fantasy, his originality, his humour, his invention in following them. We shall not stick to too detailed literary models; we shall not bind the artist to too rigidly defined modes of narrative.

We shall establish that the so-called sensuous mode of writing – where one can smell, taste and feel everything – is not automatically to be identified with a realistic mode of writing; we shall acknowledge that there are works which are sensuously written and which are not realistic and realistic works which are not written in a sensuous style. We shall have to examine carefully the question whether we really develop a plot best when our ultimate objective is to reveal the spiritual life of the characters. Our readers will perhaps find that they have not been given the key to the meaning of events if, led astray by various artistic devices, they experience only the spiritual agitation of the heroes. By adopting the forms of Balzac and Tolstoy without testing them thoroughly, we might weary our readers – the people – as much as these writers often do themselves. Realism is not a mere question of form. Were we to copy the style of these realists, we would no longer be realists.

For time flows on, and if it did not, it would be a bad prospect for those who do not sit at golden tables. Methods become exhausted; stimuli no longer work. New problems appear and demand new methods. Reality changes; in order to represent it, modes of representation must also change. Nothing comes from nothing; the new comes from the old, but that is why it is new.

The oppressors do not work in the same way in every epoch. They cannot be defined in the same fashion at all times. There are so many means for them to avoid being spotted. They call their military roads motorways; their tanks are painted so that they look like MacDuff’s woods. Their agents show blitsters on their hands, as if they were workers. No: to turn the hunter into the quarry is something that demands invention. What was popular yesterday is not today, for the people today are not what they were yesterday.

### Simpson

**Privileging code switching grants the illusion of ethical powers, but removes the ground for collective change and the testing of ethical principles.**

**Simpson 2** David English @ UC Davis Situatedness, or Why We Keep Saying Where We’re Coming From p. 232-235

Ulrich Beck's Risk Society, which can usefully be read along with Giddens's Modernity and Self-Identity (both discussed in chapter I and elsewhere) for the beginnings of a powerful analysis of the way we live now, in the moment that may be called late modernity or postmodernity, suggests that the poor old Cartesian subject has now taken such a drubbing (and it continues to suffer at the hands of many of us who are up-to-date thinkers) that the real problems are only being masked by exhuming it for regular reburial. Beck finds us experiencing a world in which nothing that is felt to be ultimately pertinent to our lives can be known through the experience of our lives. What most requires being known is now outside the individual: that which is "devoid of personal experience becomes the central determinant of personal experience," leading to a sense of "imperceptible and yet omnipresent latent causality" (Risk Society, p. 72). The assumed roles of class and family, visible even if never simply stable, are replaced by a host of "secondary agencies" too numerous to track and too mutable to hold on to (p. 131). Along with this there arise "risk conflicts" that cannot possibly be managed by individuals and that are in their scope nothing less than global and comprehensive, potentially removing all inherited protections possessed by the haves and withheld from the have nots. This complete breakdown of familiar patterns of cause and effect has, says Beck, produced a bizarre hyperbole, a **placing of all decisionmaking language (certainly not power) back in the mouths (certainly not hands) of individuals**. So we are presented with "construction kits of biographical combination possibilities" (p. 135), offered the chance to be all that we can be in a world where we can affect almost nothing that most matters to who we are and what we might become. Biography, as it had been for Sartre, becomes again the site of "systemic contradictions" that are experienced as choices (p. 137): "The floodgates are opened wide for the subjectivization and individualization of risks and contradictions produced by institutions and society" (p. 136). Beck's account (with Giddens's) asks to be read alongside Hollinger's to my mind far too affirmative recommendation of the lifestyle of making choices presented in Postethnic America. Beck's Risk Society finds that it is indeed a matter of choosing "between different options, including as to which group or subculture one wants to be identified with," but also that we have to "take the risks in doing so" (p. 88). These risks are substantial indeed, so that **the language of self-determination covers over a predicament of near-powerlessness**. Those alert to the dishonesties enshrined in the culture of empowerment will find much to identify with in Beck's analysis of the way in which "experts dump their contradictions and conflicts at the feet of the individual and leave him or her with the well intentioned invitation to judge all of this critically on the basis of his or her own notions" (p. 137). The pressures are unbearable: the individual is invited to take "a continual stand" on almost everything, and is "elevated to the **apparent throne of a world-shaper**" at the same time "as he or she **sinks into insignificance**" (p. 137). The effort to describe "individual situations" becomes more impossible than ever before owing to the proliferation of possible determinations needing to be accounted for (p. 138). Meanwhile, "handling fear and insecurity becomes an essential cultural qualification, and the cultivation of the abilities demanded for it becomes an essential mission of pedagogical institutions" (p. 76). This last observation contains another clue as to why it is that we (in the academy) so often go on speaking as if **situatedness** were a **firm knowledge-producing concept**, either by unanalyzed epistemological gestures or by **recourse to an ethical vocabulary in which no epistemology need ever be tested.** Pedagogical institutions, including not only the schools and universities, with their **monotonous** **rhetoric** of **self fashioning**, but also the popular media and the manipulators of common sense, have a powerful interest in **presenting imposed predicaments as matters of choice**, while those who resist this message find themselves driven to equally unambiguous alternatives, whereby **situatedness precludes all significant choice whatsoever.** Because neither position is tenable in the abstract, the debate between them is endless: it simply has no language in which it could possibly conclude anything. Beck suggests that we in fact live with neither kind of certitude, but with the experience of muddle and confusion in a state of considerable psychological stress: the sort of stress that 1 have argued is apparent in the rhetoric of self-affiliation with its awkward oscillation between hyperaffirmative and hypertentative declarations. (Common sense, and common usage, may then reveal more about the nature of our situatedness than many of those manning the "pedagogical institutions" would be prepared to admit.) Happy situated ness was probably always no more than a fantasy. Think of Heidegger with his hammer, hammering away happily because the act has subsumed the "equipment" in a way that "could not possibly be more suitable" because it calIs up no theorization or reflection. The more purposive the action, the more "primordial" we become. Exchanging one hammer for another more suitable one embodies the way in which "interpretation is carried out primordialIy not in a theoretical statement but in an action of circumspective concern," with no "wasting words" (Beinll and Time, pp. 98, 200). Or recall Malinowski's picture of the tribal fishermen, each totalIy absorbed in carrying out his part of the general task at hand, confident in the habits of "old tribal tradition" and "lifelong experience" ("The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Language," p. 3II). This is (or was), perhaps, happy situated ness, wherein one is connected to an environment in a manner that does not calI for reflection and where what are otherwise thought of as self and other fulfill themselves in perfect purpose. But where now are the primitive fishermen, and what would we do to them if we found them? How long can one go on hammering without hitting one's thumb? While hammering, no one has to answer Adorno's question, "who are you?" Unless of course the hammering is going on in a lumberyard governed by divided labor instead of in some idyllic do-it-yourself situation with no one else around. Modernity has mostly been a condition of having others around; hence its reactive valuation of privacy and solitude. Late modernity is experienced as a sense of having far too many others around, and takes the nightmare form of a doomsday population explosion or (in the more decorouslyaffiuent loca- tions) a building-out of green spaces. According to Beck and Giddens, and to many other analysts of late modernity, privacy itself is now so thoroughly permeated by choice-making obligations and exterior determinations ranging from the local and microorganic to the global that the word hardly has meaning. **Total situatedness, total panic.** Perhaps the old false certainties of both kinds, the ones that claim self-determination (I can make my situation) and the ones that refuse all responsibility (I am a creature of my situatedness) are now all the more marketable because of the extent of this panic.